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This paper examines the interaction between constitutional design and practice through 
a case study of Canadian federalism. Focusing on the federal architecture of the Canadian 
Constitution, the paper examines how subnational units in Canada actually compete with the 
central government, emphasizing the concrete strategies and tactics they most commonly 
employ to get their way in confrontations with central authority. The evidence affirms that 
constitutional design and structure make an important difference in the tactics and tools 
available to subnational units in a federal system, but that design is not fully constraining: 
there is considerable evidence of extraconstitutional innovation and improvisation by 
governments. Furthermore, changes in practice initiated by Canadian subnational actors have 
produced changes in the allocation of national and subnational authority that are plausibly 
characterized as constitutional in magnitude. The paper concludes that the design of the 
Canadian federal system may inadvertently undermine its capacity to stabilize itself at any 
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In the classic model of constitutionalism, a constitution is understood to be a permanent 
article of positive law containing a set of fixed instructions issued by a popular sovereign to 
its governmental agents. To ensure that constitutional commands issue only from the 
popular sovereign – to prevent the people’s agents from changing their own instructions – 
constitutions are deliberately ‘entrenched.’ That is, the constitution is rendered presumptively 
permanent by making it difficult to change, and by ensuring that the people remain the sole 
ultimate source of amending authority. This largely static model comports well with the 
philosophical premises of contractarianism, which holds that political legitimacy is founded 
on the consent of the governed (Locke 1690), and thus tends to conceive of a constitution 
as fixed and permanent – ‘established in its entirety at a definite time and place’ (Griffin 1996: 
2124), at the moment in which consent was granted.  
In sharp contrast, the constitutions of federal states are almost universally viewed as 
dynamic and continually evolving. Among those who study federalism, there is remarkable 
consensus on this point. ‘[F]ederal systems,’ according to Arthur Benz (2008: 1), ‘are highly 
dynamic.’ ‘The various parts of the system,’ M.J.C. Vile (1961: 3) observes, ‘are in continuous 
interaction.’ On account of this property, Carl Friedrich (1968: 7) claimed, ‘[f]ederal relations 
are fluctuating relations in the very nature of things.’ In short, according to Benz and 
Broschek (2013: 2), ‘federal systems are permanently in motion.’ Most importantly, what 
moves in federal systems, according to Judith Resnik (2014: 368), is the most basic, defining 
feature of any federal regime: ‘competencies are always in motion, and in more than one 
direction’ (emphasis added).  
This evolution, moreover, takes place without popular intervention by means of formal 
constitutional amendment. Consequently, as Edward McWhinney (1962: 12) wrote more 
than a half-century ago, in all federal states there is a ‘contrast between the constitution as 
originally written and the actual working constitution.’ This contrast can be severe, and thus, 
in federal systems, ‘[t]he written constitution . . . is of limited use in explaining how the 
federal system works’ (Erk 2006: 456).  
Why does this happen? Why would constitutions of federal states depart so dramatically 
from the classic conception of constitutional fixity? Granted, the classic theoretical model 
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tends to overstate the case for constitutional stability. More than two centuries of experience 
with democratically adopted constitutions have taught that constitutions are capable of 
evolving though mechanisms other than formal amendment – so-called ‘informal’ methods 
of constitutional change. For example, constitutions can change informally through judicial 
reinterpretation (Ackerman 1991). Informal constitutional change can also be driven by 
changes in the governance practices of constitutional officers (Gardner 2016). Some scholars 
argue that the forces of informal change are sufficiently strong to conclude that ‘[a]ll 
constitutions change continuously’ (Oliver and Fusaro 2011: 424).  
Even if this is correct, scholars of federalism seem nevertheless to believe that the rate 
and magnitude of change of federal constitutions far outstrips the degree of normal evolution 
in constitutions creating other kinds of states. They argue, in effect, that change – including 
change of core structural aspects of the constitutional scheme – is built into federal systems 
in ways that lack a counterpart in constitutions of nonfederal states. If true, what might 
explain this phenomenon? 
One possible explanation – and the one I wish to explore here – has to do with the 
method of entrenchment employed by federal constitutions. The conventional design 
approach to constitutional entrenchment involves little more than erection of a highly public 
expectation of compliance: the popular sovereign commands and its servants obey. This 
relatively static command-and-control approach, however, courts a significant risk: it offers 
few resources to guard against a failure of obedience by government officials. James Madison 
called this the problem of ‘parchment barriers’ (Madison 1787-1788: No. 48). On Madison’s 
account, governments are run by human beings; human beings are subject to temptation; 
and the accumulation of power is an attractive temptation that few officials can be expected 
permanently to resist. Constitutional entrenchment, Madison agreed, is necessary, but it 
cannot occur dependably through the mere issuance of commands. 
To deal with this problem, Madison proposed a radically different solution. If political 
institutions are vulnerable to human ambition, Madison argued, then ‘[a]mbition must be 
made to counteract ambition’ (Madison 1787-1788: No. 51). If entrenchment cannot be 
achieved statically, then it must be achieved dynamically, through construction of an 
equilibrated system in which strong forces align in well-balanced opposition. This task is 
accomplished through a careful division of power, undertaken against a background 
assumption that power holders will attempt periodically to expand their domains. At the 
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same time, other power holders will have an equally predictable propensity to defend their 
own domains against encroachment. Such a system is highly dynamic; it creates a kind of 
permanent contestation among holders of official power. If the system works well, 
constitutional limitations on government power are entrenched by maintenance of a dynamic 
equilibrium at the desired design parameters (Schwartz 1989: 35; Ordeshook 1993: 204). 
Federalism is such a system. By definition, a federal constitution (1) creates a national 
government; (2) recognizes the permanence and autonomy of subnational units; and (3) 
allocates to each level some measure of power (Elazar 1966). The existence and authority of 
the two orders of government is then made permanent through entrenchment: the federal 
plan ‘freezes a particular allocation of authority between provinces and the center’ (Levy 
2014: 345). This end is achieved, however, not simply through an initial textual allocation of 
competencies followed by an expectation of obedience – through the creation, that is, of 
parchment barriers. In the Madisonian model, each level of government is endowed with 
powers sufficient to allow it monitor and check the abuses of the other: ‘The different 
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself’ 
(Madison 1787-1788: No. 51). Thus, the stability of the constitutional plan depends upon 
the capacity of each order of government to ‘control’ – or at least to influence and obstruct 
– the other. To accomplish this end, the amount of power allocated to each level of 
government and the reach of its authority presumably must be calibrated with some 
precision; an imbalance in either direction could lead to a risky accumulation of power at the 
national or subnational level – the very result that federalism is instituted to preclude. Thus, 
constitutional designers carry a heavy burden: they must carefully plot out and entrench, as 
the U.S. Supreme Court has said in a comparable context, a ‘finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered’ division of powerI that will permit national and subnational governments to fight 
each other to a permanent draw. 
What Madison did not and could not know, however, was that the dynamic, contestatory 
system he contemplated does not fully solve the problem of constitutional entrenchment 
due to the phenomenon of informal constitutional change. One of the most common drivers 
of informal constitutional change is alteration by government officials of the practices they 
employ in the discharge of their official duties. As Behnke and Benz (2009: 217) explain, 
‘[c]onstitutional evolution is often initiated by unilateral action [of government officials].’ In 
Denning’s (1997: 211) formulation, these kinds of actions may properly be understood as 
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‘claims of power’ that constitute ‘“moves” made by the “legislative and executive branches 
. . . that serve as precedents for future actions.”’ II The establishment of precedents permitting 
government authority to be exercised in new ways in turn can alter the substance of the 
constitution’s grants of authority to the actors who establish these precedents. In other 
words, constitutional actors can alter their own power by changing how and when they 
exercise it, thus initiating change in the substance of the constitutional allocation of power 
(Gardner 2016: 353-364). 
If static methods of constitutional entrenchment are vulnerable to the problem of 
‘parchment barriers,’ this analysis suggests that dynamic systems of constitutional 
entrenchment may be vulnerable to what we might call the problem of ‘plastic barriers.’ That 
is, in a dynamic system, constitutional instructions may not be overtly repudiated or ignored, 
but may instead undergo alteration or evolution as holders of government power constantly 
probe for advantage in a permanent contest over public policy. 
The problem of plastic constitutional barriers is clearly presented in constitutional 
systems of federalism. Federalism is by nature a contestatory system in which it is anticipated 
that national and subnational governments will contend to secure influence and advantage 
(Bednar 2009: 63-85). As a result, the elements of informal constitutional change are 
necessarily present. First, the tools constitutional actors possess to deploy against other 
actors in contests over authority are by definition the tools of official practice. To the extent 
that the duties of officials at each level of government include monitoring and, when 
necessary, deploying power against the other level of government, the form that such 
resistance takes is inherently a mode of official practice. Second, a constitutional regime that 
furnishes government officials with incentives to struggle against one another provides them 
with incentives to prevail not merely by deploying the tools of incursion and self-defense 
that the constitution uncontroversially provides, but also to compete by changing the 
constitutional ground rules so as to develop and deploy more effective tools of contestation 
(Levinson 2011).  
The institutionalization of intergovernmental contestation thus has the potential to place 
great pressure on the stability of federal regimes. ‘The incentive to deviate from the division 
of authority,’ argues Jenna Bednar (2009: 63), ‘is inescapably built in to the federal structure.’ 
Because the system contemplates that national and subnational actors will compete against 
each other, ‘[t]he constitutional allocation of competences . . . is particularly prone to 
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entrepreneurial redefinition’ (Broschek 2011: 548). Constitutional actors, in other words, 
have an incentive to ‘try to shift the balance [of constitutional authority] incrementally in a 
direction favourable to them,’ thereby inducing a form of ‘authority migration’ (Benz and 
Colino 2011: 381). When government officials become adept players of this game, 
‘assignments of power and competences have to be continuously renegotiated’ (Benz 2008: 
1).  
In short, a constitutional regime that institutionalizes contestation among officials is a 
regime that invites unforeseeable alteration of the very aspects of the constitutional regime 
that contestation is meant to stabilize – the constitutional allocation of authority. Through 
the process of intergovernmental contestation, the location of the boundary between 
national and subnational authority may shift, initially as a matter of contingent fact, and 
eventually as a matter of constitutional reformation. Contestatory federalism, then, is a 
constitutional structure that seems to invite change, not only in the palette of tools and 
techniques that national and subnational governments deploy against one another, but also, 
over time, in the substantive allocation of authority among the two orders of government. 
If I am correct to this point, the relevant question of constitutional design in federal 
states is quite different from the one that occupied Madison. My claim is that the mechanism 
of intergovernmental contestation deployed by federalism to stabilize constitutional 
allocations of power is capable simultaneously of destabilizing those very allocations; 
federalism, in other words, is inherently a system with the capacity to destabilize itself. If so, 
then a different question arises: might some federal constitutional arrangements be more 
stable than others? Might they incur less risk of variation from the desired distribution of 
competencies, and thus endure longer? This is not an idle inquiry: by one count, 27 of the 
44 federations formed in the last two hundred years have failed either by breaking apart or 
by collapsing into a unitary state (Lemco 1991: 1). Especially in modern, ethnonational 
federations, maintenance of a particular allocation of authority between national and 
subnational governments is often a critical term of the basic constitutional bargain upon 
which the legitimacy of the state is founded. 
The balance of this paper explores these questions through a case study of the Canadian 
Constitution. It begins with an overview of the Canadian Constitution, focusing on the 
allocation of power between the national government and the provinces contemplated by 
the constitutional design. It then moves on to examine how federalism is actually practiced in 
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Canada, primarily by analyzing the tools and tactics deployed by Canadian provinces in 
moments of conflict with the central state. It also looks at the consequences of these tactics 
for the constitutional allocation of power. The paper concludes with some reflections on the 
relation between the Canadian Constitution’s federal design and the stability over time of the 
constitutional division of authority. 
 
2. A case study: Canadian federalism 
 
2.1. The structure of Canadian federalism 
In a celebrated double irony of unintended consequences, the Constitution of Canada 
was written for the express purpose of making the structure of Canadian government as 
different as possible from that of the United States. In this, the designers of the document 
succeeded, but not in a way they foresaw. Enacted at Canadian request by the British Imperial 
Parliament in 1867, the original Canadian Constitution was intended to create a highly 
centralized state with a powerful national government for the express purpose of avoiding 
what Canadians saw as the catastrophic failure of the decentralized U.S. Constitution, a 
failure that they observed at uncomfortably close range during the American Civil War. The 
resulting document – the British North America Act – did in fact create a powerful central 
government and weak provinces. Over time, however, the Canadian Constitution became 
something very different: a series of decisions by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
a British court that served as the highest judicial authority during the colonial period, reversed 
the polarity of the document to the point that Canada is today among the most decentralized 
of all federal states (Hogg 2007: '' 5.3(b), (c)). Simultaneously, the United States Constitution 
evolved from its original design as the charter of a decentralized state with a weak central 
government to something that is, for many purposes and in many circumstances, very close 
to its polar opposite. Neither set of drafters, then, obtained what they wanted, and one of 
the main differences between the two constitutional cultures today is that the fact of 
constitutional evolution is obvious to and often welcomed by Canadians, whereas it is 
sometimes denied, and often regretted, by Americans.III 
The structure of Canadian federalism is complex, and needs to be described in some 
detail. This section begins by describing the formal features established by the Canadian 
Constitution, and then moves on to describe the many informal institutions and practices 
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that overlie the constitutional structure and account for the characteristic institutions of 
Canadian federalism. 
 
2.1.1. The formal federal structure 
The current constitution of Canada was enacted in 1982 by the British Imperial 
Parliament at Canadian request, and effected the ‘patriation’ of the constitution, the most 
significant step in a long and gradual – but still incomplete – process of Canadian 
disengagement from the British Empire and corresponding assumption of self-sovereignty. 
Although the Constitution Act, 1982, made a very significant change from previous 
constitutional documents by adding for the first time a bill of rights – the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms – it left fundamentally intact the basic structure and institutions of 
government created under its 1867 predecessor. 
Under the Canadian Constitution, national legislative power is vested in Parliament, 
which consists of a House of Commons and a Senate. Members of Commons are popularly 
elected. Senators are formally appointed by the Governor General, an official appointed by 
the Queen, but by long practice the Governor General makes appointments only upon 
recommendation of the cabinet (Hogg 2007: ' 9.5(d)). Senators serve no terms, leaving only 
once they reach the constitutional retirement age of 75.  
The Senate was originally intended to serve as a forum for representation of provincial 
interests: the Constitution Act provides that Senators shall be appointed in equal numbers 
from Ontario, Quebec, the Atlantic Provinces, and the Western Provinces, the traditional 
four regions of Canada. However, the possibility that the Senate might serve as an effective 
forum for subnational power was thoroughly undermined by the constitutional method of 
appointment. Rather than vesting the appointment of Senators in the provinces or regions 
themselves, the constitution vests it for all practical purposes in the federal cabinet (Hogg 
2007: ' 9.5(d)), with the predictable result that the Senate is comprised of cohorts of hand-
picked allies of the governing party in Commons. In consequence, the Senate has historically 
served neither as a vehicle for the exertion of subnational influence on national power, nor 
even as an effective check on the national legislative power of the Commons. Indeed, when 
Canadians speak of Parliament they generally mean the House of Commons; like the British 
House of Lords on which it was modeled, the Senate is for most purposes an irrelevancy. 
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In Canada, then, national politics effectively does not take place in a bicameral legislature 
in which one house represents national and the other subnational interests; Canadian national 
politics take place in a unicameral parliamentary house in which national political parties are 
the primary organizing institutions (Smith 2010: 92-93). With the one exception of 
guaranteed provincial representation on the Supreme Court of Canada – three of the nine 
justices must be from Quebec – formal constitutional protections for subnational interests 
and autonomy are found primarily not in the blueprint of national institutions, but in the 
constitutional allocation of powers between the national and provincial governments.  
The Canadian Constitution divides the powers of government principally into those that 
are exercised exclusively by Parliament and those that are exercised exclusively by the 
provinces. Under these provisions, the federal government has exclusive power over matters 
such as trade and commerce, unemployment insurance, military affairs, navigation, banking, 
currency, and patents and copyrights. It also has power over marriage and divorce, as well as 
the substantive criminal law. Most importantly, the national government is granted the power 
‘to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada’ (the so-called POGG 
power), a provision originally intended to reserve residual power to the national level (Hogg 
2007: ' 17.1). Under the constitutional principle of paramountcy, validly enacted federal laws 
displace conflicting provincial laws. Exclusively provincial powers include provincial fiscal 
affairs, hospitals, intraprovincial public works, nonrenewable resources, education, the 
administration of justice, and, most notably, property and civil rights. 
Things have turned out to be more complicated. Most importantly, judicial decisions by 
the Privy Council interpreting the constitution eventually reversed the originally 
contemplated balance of power, in two principal ways. First, the provincial power over 
property and civil rights, probably originally intended to do little more than permit Quebec 
to retain its private civil law following confederation with English-speaking, common-law 
provinces, was expanded by decisions of the Privy Council to make it one of the most 
significant powers exercised at any level. Much of what is now widely regarded as public law 
– regulation of the environment, labor, health, social services – has been deemed to fall 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of provinces as the regulation of property (Hogg 2007: ' 
21.2). Second, the national POGG power, probably intended to be of very broad scope, was 
construed narrowly by the Privy Council. For example, the federal POGG power was held 
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inadequate to sustain federal regulation of economically significant industries of nationwide 
reach, relegating their regulation to the provinces, an extremely important power under 
contemporary economic conditions.IV 
Additional complications arise from the fact that many powers have turned out to be 
shared. In the area of immigration, for example, the federal government has power over the 
admission of immigrants, but the provinces exercise authority over settlement and 
integration of immigrants (Banting 2012: 262-263). In the realm of criminal law, although 
the federal government has authority to define crimes, provincial power over the 
administration of justice gives them substantial influence over the course of criminal justice. 
Control of trade and transportation are divided along a hazy line distinguishing 
interprovincial from intraprovincial activity (Hogg 2007: ch. 20). The federal government has 
authority to negotiate treaties, but cannot unilaterally implement them when they deal with 
matters falling within provincial jurisdiction (Bowman 2012). 
National and provincial power are further entangled under the Canadian Constitution by 
the constitutional commitment to ‘equalization,’ a system of intergovernmental income 
redistribution: 
 
‘Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization 
payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably 
comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation (Const. Act, 1982, ' 36(2)).’ 
 
The fiscal capacity of the provinces varies dramatically, and equalization payments by the 
federal government help smooth out inequalities in the ability of each province to provide 
its citizens with the kind of public services available elsewhere in the nation.V In the Canadian 
context, however, equalization addresses another kind of mismatch: the mismatch between 
power and resources. In many issue areas, principal authority is vested in the provinces, yet 
it is the federal government that has greater access to the fiscal resources necessary to 
accomplish programmatic objectives (Simeon 1972: 146-147). Consequently, in many cases 
if nationally significant goals are to be accomplished, subnational power must be yoked to 
national funding, a task requiring intergovernmental cooperation on a broad scale. 
One additional area deserves mention: the extraordinarily complex provisions for 
amending the constitution, a highly contentious issue in Canadian constitutional politics. 
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Under the Constitution Act, 1982, the general amending rule requires that any amendment 
proposed by Parliament be ratified by ‘at least two-thirds of the provinces that have, in the 
aggregate, . . . at least fifty per cent of the population of all the provinces.’ VI This is known 
colloquially as the ‘seven-fifty formula’ because it requires the approval of seven of the ten 
provinces having more than fifty percent of the population. Its significance, however, lies in 
the way it avoids giving any province a veto while at the same time ensuring that all 
amendments enjoy broad regional support. First, any group of seven provinces necessarily 
must include at least one of the four Western provinces and at least one of the four Atlantic 
provinces, all but eliminating the risk of outright regional exploitation. Second, the fifty-
percent population threshold requires either Ontario or Quebec to be among the ratifying 
provinces, guaranteeing support by at least one of the major centers of wealth and 
population. 
Complicating matters, however, is a provision that permits provinces to opt out of 
constitutional amendments enacted by this method: ‘An amendment . . . shall not have effect 
in a province the legislative assembly of which has expressed its dissent thereto by resolution 
supported by a majority its members. . . .’ VII The constitutional amending rules also provide 
that amendments relating to a small number of issues may be enacted only by unanimous 
approval of the provinces, and that an amendment applying to fewer than all provinces must 
be approved by the legislatures of those provinces to which it applies. These rules on their 
face establish the basis for an unusual constitutional regime of asymmetrical application. On 
the other hand, to the extent that non-uniform application of constitutional rules is seen by 
national majority coalitions as something to be avoided – generally the case outside of 
Quebec – the amendment rules create incentives to change the constitution by means other 
than formal amendment, a topic to which we shall return shortly. 
 
2.1.2. Canadian federalism in practice 
As Gerald Baier (2012: 79), among many others, has observed, ‘Canada’s federal system 
features a rather large gap between the jurisdictional map of the written constitution and the 
actual activities of its governments.’ It is therefore essential to describe some of the important 
informal institutions that have arisen on the constitutional landscape. I shall mention three: 
constitutional conventions, responsible government, and executive federalism.  
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Like the British constitution that served to a great extent as its model, the Canadian 
Constitution is found not only in written legal texts but also in conventions of official 
behavior that have, through long practice and the consolidation of widespread public support 
and expectation, come to be regarded as having constitutional status (Hogg 2007: ' 1.10). 
Although the lack of any textual warrant precludes their enforcement by judicial review, 
constitutional principles created by convention are nevertheless observed, often strictly, 
mainly through the force of convention. To give a prominent example, one very important 
constitutional convention institutionalizes the virtual elimination of formally granted British 
royal power. Section 55 of the Canadian Constitution plainly states: 
 
‘Where a Bill passed by the Houses of the Parliament is presented to the Governor General for the Queen’s 
Assent, he shall declare, according to his Discretion, . . . either that he assents thereto in the Queen’s Name, 
or that he withholds the Queen’s Assent, or that he reserves the Bill for the Signification of the Queen’s 
Pleasure.’ 
 
This provision, by its incontrovertible language, gives the Governor General a power to 
veto federal legislation, yet by longstanding convention that power is never exercised. The 
Governor General’s assent to federal legislation is still required for its validity, and such 
consent is routinely given, but it is given on the advice of the Prime Minister and cabinet 
(Hogg 2007: ' 9.5(d)); the giving of royal assent has thus been reduced by convention to a 
ministerial task of ritual signature. 
Other significant conventions apply to the operation of Canada’s constitutional 
federalism, and indeed have contributed significantly to the undermining of the original 
constitutional plan for a strongly centralized state. Among these is the disappearance of the 
federal power of ‘disallowance’ of provincial legislation. Under the Canadian Constitution, 
the Governor General appoints Lieutenant Governors for each province. Much as the 
Governor General is granted the power to veto federal legislation, so the Lieutenant 
Governors are constitutionally granted the authority to disallow provincial legislation. Two 
conventions have made these provisions virtually dead letters. First, the Governor General 
does not exercise actual discretion in the appointment of Lieutenant Governors; he or she 
makes these appointments on the advice of the Prime Minister and cabinet, thereby 
effectively transferring to the federal government the power to disallow provincial legislation 
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(Hogg 2007: '' 5.3(f), 9.3). Another convention, however, restrains the federal government 
from exercising this authority; it was last exercised in 1943, and any attempt to use it now 
would likely precipitate what would surely qualify as a constitutional crisis. The result, of 
course, has been to grant to the provinces a kind of genuine autonomy not contemplated by 
the original constitutional design. 
Yet another constitutional convention relating to the operation of federalism is the 
appointment by Prime Ministers of a cabinet that includes representatives of all the major 
Canadian regions – Ontario, Quebec, the West, and the Atlantic provinces. This convention 
was initiated by Canada’s leading founder and first Prime Minister, John Macdonald, as a way 
to ensure high-level federal attention to sectional interests when other institutions of the 
newly-created constitution seemed ill-suited to serve this function (Smith 2010: 43). 
By far the most important and wide-ranging constitutional convention, however, is the 
convention establishing ‘responsible government.’ Responsible government refers to the 
British or ‘Westminster’ system of parliamentary government, which Canadians have 
adopted. In that system, executive power is exercised not by its formal holder, the Queen, 
but by the Prime Minister, who is selected by the majority party or party coalition in 
Parliament, and his or her cabinet. The government is ‘responsible’ in the sense that the 
executive is answerable to, and must have the continuing support of, the Parliament. The 
system of responsible government was similarly adopted in each of the Canadian provinces, 
where the head of the dominant legislative party and first minister is known as the Premier. 
Finally, there is the practice of ‘executive federalism,’ a process of policy making in which 
major decisions about national policy are made not in the deliberations of a broadly 
representative national legislature – the paradigmatic method in modern democratic states – 
but through intergovernmental negotiations among the chief executives of the national and 
subnational governments.VIII Executive federalism is not so much a constitutional 
convention as an institutional consequence of an unusual set of interactions among Canadian 
constitutional structures, both formal and conventional. It is, in Ronald Watts’s (1989: 1) apt 
description, ‘a logical dynamic resulting from the marriage of federal and parliamentary 
institutions.’ 
Three principal conditions have underwritten the rise of executive federalism in Canada. 
First, Canada is not merely a federal state, but one in which the provinces exercise a very 
substantial degree of independent power, and the ability of the federal government to 
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accomplish its objectives thus often depends upon provincial cooperation. Moreover, the 
expansion of the scope of governmental intervention in daily life over the course of the 
twentieth century, in Canada as elsewhere in the West, has only increased the number of 
occasions on which programmatic cooperation at both levels of government is required to 
achieve widely desired public objectives (Simeon 1972: 3-4). 
Second, Canadian national and provincial governments all employ Westminster-style 
parliamentary institutions. The Westminster form of government by design greatly 
concentrates power in the hands of the prime minister and cabinet (Watts 1989: 1). It does 
so by effacing any separation of legislative and executive power and placing control over 
both branches in the hands of the same individual – the prime minister – who simultaneously 
heads the executive branch and the majority party in parliament. As a result, the Canadian 
Prime Minister and provincial Premiers can ‘deliver’ their governments in a way that U.S. 
presidents and governors cannot (Savoie 2009: 125);IX that is, they can with considerable 
confidence make representations and commitments to others about what their governments 
will do because they exercise a very strong degree of control over what their governments 
will do – as the Supreme Court of Canada has observed, ‘the reality of Canadian governance 
[is] that, except in certain rare cases, the executive frequently and de facto controls the 
legislature.’X American chief executives, in contrast, must contend with independent and 
sometimes cantankerous legislatures whose cooperation they have no power to direct. 
Finally, because the number of Canadian jurisdictions is small – one national government, 
ten provincial governments, and three territorial governments – the agreement of only 
fourteen individuals, a very manageable number, is required effectively to make virtually any 
kind of national policy. Taken together, these conditions have created a system in which ‘the 
big issues of public policy have been settled in an elaborate system of intergovernmental 
accommodations presided over by the first ministers’ (Carty and Wolinetz 2004: 66).  
 
2.2. Tools and methods of subnational influence 
Having reviewed the main structures and institutions of Canadian federalism, we are now 
in a position to examine the concrete methods by which subnational units in Canada 
influence national policy and get what they want from the national government. In brief, due 
to the institutionalization of executive federalism, by far the most common method to which 
Canadian provinces resort to get their way is negotiation. So dominant is negotiation as a 
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mode of intergovernmental relations that it establishes a baseline against which all other 
modes are conventionally perceived in most of Canada as derogations. I describe two of 
these below: unilateral action and the making of threats, including the threat of secession. 
The subsection concludes with a brief examination of modes of subnational influence that 
are used widely in other federal states, but play a much smaller role in Canada: exploitation 
of political party channels, mobilization of popular political opinion, and constitutional 
litigation. 
 
2.2.1. Negotiation and deal-making 
The emergence of executive federalism in Canada has produced a system in which major 
national policy decisions are made primarily through ‘a process of direct negotiation between 
the executives of different governments’ – what Richard Simeon (1972: 5) has aptly termed 
‘provincial diplomacy.’ In this system, characterized by ‘extensive consultation and 
negotiation on an issue-by-issue basis’ (Bakvis and Tanguay 2008: 130), Canadian provinces 
attempt to influence the actions of the national government through bargaining. 
Comprehensive multilateral negotiations. In its purest form, the intergovernmental bargaining 
associated with executive federalism occurs by way of collective negotiation among all 
fourteen heads of government. These types of proceedings may occur within the formal 
confines of the institutionalized and routinized First Ministers Conference (FMC); on a more 
ad hoc basis in the form of First Ministers Meetings called to deal with occasional crises; or, 
from time to time, in quiet, behind-the-scenes consultations out of the public eye (Papillon 
and Simeon 2004). Not all such negotiations involve the prime minister and premiers directly; 
many Canadian intergovernmental negotiations are handled by ministers or bureaucrats with 
specific portfolios acting as representatives of their governments.XI Such meetings at all levels 
have become so commonplace, and so much an accepted aspect of the permanent 
architecture of Canadian intergovernmental relations, that an elaborate administrative 
apparatus has evolved to support them, including the Canadian Intergovernmental 
Secretariat, the Intergovernmental Conference, and a wide variety of intergovernmental 
affairs agencies, especially at the provincial level (Pollard 1986). Together, these institutions 
are capable of supporting negotiations of great breadth and complexity on subjects of 
considerable political controversy, producing at their best ‘a broad multilateral agreement, 
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including common principles and goals and a broad funding structure’ (Simeon and Nugent 
2012: 65). 
One of the most successful comprehensive intergovernmental negotiations is the 
Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), a deal struck between the federal and provincial 
governments in 1994.XII AIT grew out of longstanding problems rooted in the awkward 
constitutional division between the federal and provincial governments of regulatory 
authority over trade and commerce. Under the Canadian Constitution, the federal 
government is granted exclusive authority over ‘The Regulation of Trade and Commerce,’ 
but decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of Canada narrowed its scope 
considerably, simultaneously expanding the authority over trade of provinces under the 
heading of power to regulate property.XIII This division of authority then encouraged the 
provinces to adopt protectionist policies that limited the mobility of goods and labor, 
impairing national economic performance (MacDonald Commission 1985: Vol. 3, 101-135). 
As concerns grew that these barriers to free internal trade were harming not only Canada’s 
domestic prosperity but its ability to compete in an increasingly global economy, intense 
negotiations were initiated to bypass constitutional limitations and create by mutual 
agreement a system of unimpeded internal trade (Doern and MacDonald 1999). The final 
product, the AIT, prohibits the erection of internal trade barriers, guarantees non-
discrimination in economic opportunities on the basis of origin or residency, and commits 
all governments to the liberalization of trade. 
Another important example of multilateral negotiation is the Social Union Framework 
Agreement (SUFA). Reached in 1999, the SUFA agreement established a collaborative 
framework among the federal government and all of the provinces except Quebec – which 
did not in the end join the agreement – to develop and structure social programs on a basis 
of equality, respect for human rights, and geographical uniformity of access to social 
programs and services, and committed the governments to the elimination of barriers to 
mobility arising from residency requirements for social programs, and various other 
measures.XIV 
Bilateral negotiations. The opportunities for Canadian provinces to influence national policy 
by way of negotiation are not limited to comprehensive, nationwide initiatives. As Bakvis 
and Brown (2010: 485) observe, Canadian intergovernmental relations ‘are not so much a 
matrix as a series of dyadic relations: of the executives of the federal government and the 
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executives of the provinces and territories, together, one-by-one, or, occasionally, in regional 
groups.’ On account of this flexibility, provinces can, and frequently have, successfully 
influenced national policy in their favor through bilateral negotiations with the federal 
government.  
Sometimes bilateral negotiations can take place on a single issue of interest primarily to 
one or a few provinces. One well-known example is the negotiation between Ottawa and the 
provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia that led to what are known as 
the Atlantic Accords (Feehan 2009). Under the Canadian Constitution, provinces in general 
have exclusive authority over non-renewable natural resources located within their borders. 
Jurisdiction over offshore resources, however, had been less clear. When, in the 1970s, oil 
prices rose dramatically, settling ownership of oil deposits off the coasts of Newfoundland, 
Labrador, and Nova Scotia suddenly became a pressing issue. In 1984, the Supreme Court 
of Canada ruled that ownership of offshore oil reserves lay with the federal government. 
Rather than concluding the issue, however, the judicial ruling became the point of departure 
for lengthy intergovernmental negotiations in which the provinces took the position that the 
judicial ruling deprived them of something that was theirs, and for which they ought to be 
compensated (Feehan 2009: 176-177). 
This was enough to bring the federal government to the table, and under the eventual 
agreements, an Offshore Petroleum Board was established as a joint federal-provincial 
agency to manage development of the oil resources. Provincial taxation was permitted as 
though the resources were provincially owned, so that the provinces were able to raise 
revenue from both royalties and corporate taxation. At the same time, the federal 
equalization formula was adjusted in favor of the two provinces. Normally, the receipt by a 
province of unanticipated revenue would result in an offset, or ‘clawback,’ of equalization 
payments by the federal government. Newfoundland and Labrador, and later Nova Scotia, 
received reprieves from operation of the clawback principle for periods of twelve and ten 
years, respectively (Feehan 2009: 177-183). Subsequently, complaints by other provinces, 
loud politicking by Newfoundland and Labrador, and changes in federal administrations, led 
to repeated renegotiations of the deal in the ensuing years. 
Bilateral intergovernmental deal-making does not always occur in the context of issues 
of concern solely to specific provinces; it also can be embedded in more comprehensive 
negotiations among all the governments over programs intended to have nationwide reach. 
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In particular, in order to reach agreements of comprehensive scope, the federal government 
will sometimes cut side deals with individual provinces to secure their agreement to the 
broader programmatic framework. For example, in order to induce agreement to the AIT by 
British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec, and Newfoundland, the federal government agreed 
during negotiations to provisions creating narrow (and frankly protectionist) exclusions for 
British Columbia and Alberta’s export of logs, Quebec’s export approval measures relating 
to unprocessed fish, and Newfoundland’s requirement for in-province fish processing.XV 
Another circumstance in which bilateral deals are struck is the negotiation of provincial 
authority to opt out entirely from a deal reached between the federal government and the 
other provinces. For example, negotiations over the Canada Pension Plan in the 1960s 
resulted in the inclusion at the insistence of Quebec of a provision allowing provinces to opt 
out and then recover lost funding on their own through an abatement of the federal income 
tax in the province exercising the option. This arrangement – not the first of its kind – 
authorized Quebec to ‘take full responsibility for programs that in the rest of the country 
were managed jointly by the federal and provincial governments or even by Ottawa alone’ 
(McRoberts 1997: 41). While opt-out provisions often are available to any province, they are 
frequently included because only one or two provinces express an interest in them. 
Constitutional negotiations. The combination in Canada of executive federalism and a 
constitutional amending formula that does not require popular participation creates 
conditions in which Canadian intergovernmental negotiations can extend not merely to 
policy within the constitutional framework, but to the terms of the basic constitutional 
framework itself. During the mid-twentieth century, this process was both quiet and routine:  
 
‘Provincial consent was not obtained through high-profile conferences with all the players at the table and 
a wide range of constitutional issues on the block. On the contrary, the federal government sought each 
province’s consent in turn for each amendment, and, with few exceptions, this consent was quietly given 
by provincial executives agreeing in correspondence, not by the provincial legislatures (Russell 1992: 65).’ 
 
Even when agreement to formal constitutional amendments has been impossible to 
obtain, intergovernmental negotiation has nevertheless from time to time produced their 
functional equivalent: ‘[f]ederal-provincial relations are often attempts to get around 
constitutional strictures, and in doing so they may result in de facto constitutional change’ 
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(Simeon 1972: 41). An example is negotiated efforts to circumvent the constitutional 
allocation of powers through the practice of ‘inter-delegation.’ The Canadian Constitution, 
as indicated earlier, allocates power between the federal and provincial governments in ways 
that are sometimes seen at both levels of government as impediments to the enactment of 
desired programs. Initially, the various governments sometimes attempted to get around this 
problem by agreeing essentially to swap powers as needed through a process of direct mutual 
delegation. When this plan was judicially invalidated, a different arrangement was worked 
out whereby the federal government delegated federal programmatic authority to provincial 
administrative agencies (Hogg 2007: '' 14.3(a), (b)), effectuating de facto a negotiated 
alteration of the constitutional allocation of power. 
At the limit, provincial initiatives, especially at the insistence of Quebec, have precipitated 
rounds of metaconstitutional politics, in which the prime minister and premiers have agreed 
to rewrite the Canadian Constitution in comprehensive and far-reaching ways. In 1987, an 
agreement – the Meech Lake Accord – was concluded in principle. That agreement would, 
among other things, have recognized Quebec as a ‘distinct society,’ given it a greater and 
asymmetrical role in immigration, provided each province with the power to veto 
constitutional amendments, and placed limits on the federal spending power (Hogg 2007: ' 
4.1(c)). After an agreement had been reached but before it could be implemented, 
unexpected changes in political leadership in New Brunswick and Manitoba eliminated the 
unanimity necessary to formalize the agreed constitutional amendments (Russell 1992: 141-
142). A similar process of metaconstitutional negotiation was completed in 1992, this time 
with the sustained unanimous support of provincial leaders, resulting in the Charlottetown 
Accord. In an unusual move, however, the Accord provided for popular participation in the 
form of a national referendum, sending to a rare, narrow defeat the outcome of 
intergovernmental constitutional negotiations (Lusztig 1994). 
Having reviewed in some depth the baseline method by which Canadian subnational 
units influence national political affairs, I turn to some other tools that Canadian provinces 
sometimes deploy to achieve their objectives. 
 
2.2.2. Ignoring the federal government 
Notwithstanding the dominant norm of mutual consultation and negotiation, Canadian 
provinces sometimes get their way simply by ignoring the federal government altogether and 
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pursuing provincial goals directly, through the direct and unmediated exercise of provincial 
power. This is to some extent more possible in Canada than in other federal states on account 
of the large measure of power constitutionally allocated to the provinces. Quebec, for 
example, has an elaborate provincial program of ‘interculturalism’ relating to the settlement 
and integration into French culture of immigrants (Banting 2012). In other settings, the 
provinces have made direct use of their powers to counteract unilateral uses of federal power 
of which they disapprove. For instance, some time after extensive intergovernmental 
negotiations produced a nationwide health insurance program, the federal government for 
financial reasons decided that it could not afford to continue the program at its negotiated 
scope, and unilaterally cut its funding. At that point, the provinces stepped up and raised the 
revenue necessary to continue the program in its original form (Taylor 1989). 
Occasionally, however, provinces act unilaterally not to exercise power in areas of their 
acknowledged competence but as a kind of power entrepreneurialism meant to seize and 
expand their authority. A good example of this is the history of Quebec foreign policy 
adventurism. In 1965, Quebec claimed, on the basis of the Canadian Constitution’s 
requirement of provincial cooperation in treaty implementation, that provinces could have their 
own foreign policies, and it took the first step in this direction by signing an educational 
agreement with France. Federal officials first became alarmed when, in a 1967 visit to 
Montreal, French President Charles De Gaulle during a public appearance spontaneously – 
and to the horror of his advisors – exclaimed ‘Vive le Québec libre!’ Before Quebec could 
make any additional moves in response to De Gaulle’s prodding, federal officials quickly 
‘rejected Québec’s claims for diplomatic independence, on the grounds that national 
sovereignty is indivisible in international law’ (Clarkson 1989). Nevertheless, consistent with 
Canadian norms of consultation and negotiation, they simultaneously invited the provinces 
to take a more active role in formulating foreign policy in areas related to their constitutional 
authority. 
Quebec, however, pushed this principle further than Ottawa could tolerate. In 1968, 
Gabon invited Quebec’s minister of education to an international conference of 
francophone nations, without consulting or notifying Ottawa. Federal officials rebuked both 
Quebec and Gabon, but when the same behavior was repeated, Ottawa severed diplomatic 
relations with Gabon in retaliation (Mahler 1994). Quebec’s entrepreneurialism, however, 
eventually yielded a settlement it found acceptable: foreign policy in some areas was 
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thereafter conducted on a cooperative basis, and the federal government agreed to permit 
Quebec to become directly and officially involved on its own account in some international 
organizations. Given the ways in which the Canadian constitutional system is capable, in 
time, of transmuting practice to constitutionally entrenched convention, a degree of power 
entrepreneurism at the provincial level seems understandable. 
A final way in which provinces act by ignoring the federal government is to exclude it 
from interprovincial negotiations. In 2003, the premiers of the ten provinces and the 
territories formed the Council of the Federation (COF), an organization similar to the more 
established First Ministers Conference, but without the presence of the federal government 
(Simeon and Nugent 2012: 67) . Motivated in part by a growing feeling that recent federal 
administrations were not acting in a sufficiently consultative manner, the premiers organized 
themselves, in their own words, ‘because they believe it is important for provinces and 
territories to play a leadership role in revitalizing the Canadian federation and building a more 
constructive and cooperative federal system.’XVI Thus, the COF coordinates provincial policy 
on matters in which federal involvement is not needed, and attempts to develop consensus 
positions among the provinces to enable them to present a united front in collective 
negotiations with Ottawa. 
 
2.2.3. Threats 
The making of threats is the polar opposite of the Canadian default preference for 
intergovernmental consultation and negotiation, yet provinces have from time to time 
deployed this tool in efforts to get what they want. The most notable kind of threat is of 
course the threat of secession, a tactic deployed by Quebec periodically over the last thirty 
or so years. Although it has never been entirely clear how seriously Quebec’s threats to secede 
ought to be taken, the threat of secession has been sufficient on at least two occasions to 
bring the federal government – and with it, the other Canadian provinces – to the bargaining 
table for metaconstitutional negotiations addressed mainly to accommodating Quebec’s 
grievances in order to keep it within the dominion. After the failure of the Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown Accords, Quebec held an internal referendum on secession in 1995, which 
failed by a narrow margin (Hogg 2007: ' 4.1(c)).XVII Since then, Quebec governments have 
threatened not so much to secede as to hold another referendum on secession. This occurred 
most recently in the Fall of 2012, when the Parti Québécois took control of the Quebec 
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parliament on a platform that included a pledge to hold such a referendum, a threat it did 
not carry out. 
Unlike the United States, where subnational threats to engage in minor acts of defiance 
are often enough to get the attention of the national government, in Canada the availability 
of the secession threat seems to have helped create a context in which public threats of lesser 
disobedience are seen as insufficiently powerful to call attention to provincial grievances, 
especially given the ready availability of private, civil, and often meaningful bilateral 
negotiations with the federal government. As a result, other provinces have occasionally 
hinted at the possibility that they, too, might contemplate secession. Some Newfoundland 
premiers, for example, have found it expedient to invoke the threat of secession. In the 
1970s, Premier Frank Moores raised eyebrows elsewhere in Canada by occasionally using 
slogans such as ‘masters in our own house’ (evoking the Québécois nationalist slogan maîtres 
chez nous) and ‘Vive Terre Neuve Libre’ (Marland 2010: 161). More recently, Premier Danny 
Williams ordered Canadian flags removed from provincial buildings. Williams’s tactics did 
indeed produce results in the form of a renegotiation of the Atlantic Accords. Rhetoric in 
Alberta has also occasionally flirted with threats to secede. 
 
2.2.4. Other tools of subnational influence 
Several other informal tools of influence that often receive heavy usage by subnational 
units in other federal states are invoked either infrequently or not at all by Canadian 
provinces. One such tool that is strikingly unavailable to Canadian provinces is the ability to 
exercise influence at the national level through the medium of political parties.XVIII In many 
federations, subnational officials can call upon fellow partisans in the national legislature to 
press their interests. This is all but impossible in Canada due to the extreme decentralization 
and fluidity of Canadian political parties: although national and provincial parties were more 
integrated in the past, today ‘Canadian parties, and the party systems they constitute, are now 
largely disconnected’ (Carty and Wolinetz 2004: 302-303). As a result, Canadian parties do 
not offer paths of political influence that cross constitutional lines of authority; indeed, the 
centralization of power associated with the Westminster system intensifies the autonomy of 
national and regional or provincial parties because under that system, a minority party in a 
province has no standing to approach the central government, even if it is controlled by the 
same party (Simeon 1972: 31).XIX Some idea of the degree to which Canadian national and 
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provincial parties fail to align can be gleaned from the career of Jean Charest, who after 
service as a cabinet minister in the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney and a career 
as leader of the federal Progressive Conservative Party – the opposition party to Jean 
Chrétien’s federal Liberals during the 1990s – went on to become the leader of Quebec’s 
Liberal Party and Premier of the province. 
In addition, Canadian parties have long adhered to a tradition of forming minority 
governments rather than negotiating their way into majority coalitions (Bakvis and Tanguay 
2008: 130). As a result, a national party with a regional base in one or a few provinces typically 
cannot use the occasion of formation of a national government to extract concessions 
regarding subnational interests as a condition of joining a coalition government. 
Another extraconstitutional tactic of subnational influence that is used very infrequently 
by Canadian provinces is mobilization of popular opinion.XX Although it has been tried 
occasionally, most notably by Newfoundland Premier Danny Williams to generate pressure 
on Ottawa to renegotiate bilateral deals concerning revenue from natural resources, it does 
not seem an especially effective tactic. One reason may be a Canadian political culture that 
stresses respectful consultation over dramatic confrontation, but another may be simply that 
Canadian politics is not highly democratic in the sense of cultivating broad popular 
involvement – the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ (Bakvis and Skogstad 2002: 19). 
Finally, despite the availability of a widely respected constitutional court with a power of 
judicial review and a demonstrated willingness to elaborate the boundaries of constitutional 
powers, Canadian provinces over the last three decades have rarely resorted to litigation to 
get what they want from the federal government. At one time this was a relatively common 
tactic; as Russell (1992: 97) reports, between 1975 and 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada 
decided some eighty constitutional cases dealing with the allocation of power. Judicial rulings 
were subsequently shown, however, to be weak constraints on power because of the ability 
of federal and provincial officials to negotiate quasi-constitutional or even formal 
constitutional changes.XXI Furthermore, ‘[i]n Canada, . . . frequent recourse to the courts is 
sometimes seen as an indicator of breakdown of these more consensual, administrative 
mechanisms’ (Simeon 2000: 148). Consequently, intergovernmental agreements of the kind 
described earlier have largely eclipsed the courts as the institutional vehicle for assigning 
power (Baier 2012: 86-91). 
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3. Conclusions: The Impact of  Constitutional Design on Federal 
Stability 
 
Unlike subnational units in many federal states, Canadian provinces have ready access to 
extremely powerful tools to influence national policy and actions, including negotiated 
alteration of the federal constitution itself. As a result, they do not need to resort to 
improvised weaker tools, as is often the case elsewhere (Gardner 2005: 87-98; Gardner and 
Abad 2011). The availability of such tools makes Canadian provinces potentially extremely 
effective advocates of provincial interests in the arena of national policy making. 
Nevertheless, this provincial effectiveness may come at a price to the extent that it results 
from what might be called the ‘hyperplasticity’ of the Canadian Constitution’s allocations of 
federal and provincial power. 
By hyperplasticity in this context, I mean that the capacity of provinces to elevate policy 
disputes with Ottawa to the level of constitutional disputes – to convert negotiations over 
policy into negotiations over the constitutional allocation of national and provincial powers 
– seems to create an incentive structure in which governments have significant incentives to 
raise the stakes in every negotiation. In this environment, policy disagreements between the 
provincial and federal government carry inherently the potential to serve as an opening for 
constitutional dispute, and the constitution therefore need not be seen by the players as 
establishing a set of binding institutional structures and constraints within which other 
decisions are taken. Instead, governments engaged in conflict may be tempted to view the 
constitution as provisional and subject to renegotiation whenever it seems to offer them a 
losing position. If you are going to lose in a policy dispute conducted according to a particular 
set of rules, why accept the rules if they can be changed mid-negotiation? If the constitution 
allocates a power to the national level and the national government will not exercise that 
power in a way congenial to a province, why should a province hold out for its policy 
preference when it can instead press for a reallocation of the power in question to the 
provincial level? In these circumstances, the practice of intergovernmental relations has a 
distinct tendency to collapse into pure, unconstrained politics.XXII Constitutional flexibility, 
of course, has its benefits; the ability of Canadian governments to negotiate their way past 
constitutional obstacles has ‘on many occasions . . . allowed constitutional rigidities to be 
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circumvented’ (Bakvis and Skogstad 2002: 8). But it may be possible for this fluidity to go 
too far. As Marc-Antoine Adam has observed,  
 
‘what is striking with Canadian federalism is that we try to govern this country without the assistance of a 
legal framework, i.e., the Constitution. … That we should constantly be negotiating is perhaps normal; 
that there should be no permanent agreed-upon rules to govern our negotiations and what we negotiate is 
more troublesome. But this is what a constitution is meant to provide: a set of fundamental rules or a 
framework within which the day-to-day political process can take place. Lack of agreement on day-to-day 
political issues is normal and healthy. Lack of agreement on the fundamental rules is a different matter. In 
fact, one could say that in our federation, because of this lack of agreed-upon fundamental rules, the 
management of what should be day-to-day political issues has a tendency to mutate into quasi-
constitutional negotiations, with the ironical result that Canada, for wanting to avoid its constitution, finds 
itself locked in a state of permanent constitutional debate’ (Adam 2009: 297-298). 
 
Moreover, as Choudhry (2003: 78) notes, the fact that Canadian governments prefer to 
settle their disputes through judicially unenforceable intergovernmental agreements instead 
of through, say, the creation of mutually binding statutory law, suggests an underlying 
preference for remaining at all times completely free and unbound, just as states are in 
international diplomacy. 
* * * * * 
Federal constitutions do not attempt to preserve the state by suppressing conflict. Quite 
to the contrary, federal constitutions begin from the premise that intrasocietal conflict is 
inevitable and neither can nor should be suppressed. Instead, federal constitutions seek to 
preserve the stability of the state by creating a forum in which, if all goes well, conflict can 
emerge predictably and safely – the forum of intergovernmental contestation. In that, the 
Canadian Constitution has succeeded: conflict between the provinces and the central 
government is frequent and open, and the arena of intergovernmental contestation has 
become by far the most important and the most flexible forum within which policy conflicts 
among Canadians are resolved. 
Yet it is by no means clear that the forces aligned in opposition during intergovernmental 
conflict are balanced in a way that achieve a Madisonian equilibrium revolving reliably around 
a politically consensual center of constitutional gravity. The design of the Canadian 
Constitution has encouraged the emergence of negotiation as the dominant mechanism by 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
27 
which intergovernmental contestation is waged. Yet that same design has not been successful 
in containing the scope of such negotiations within the parameters fixed by the constitution. 
If the success of a federal state is measured by the robust endurance of a mutually agreeable 
division of authority among the orders of government, the Canadian Constitution may be 
guilty of purchasing short-term peace at the expense of long-term risk to constitutional 
stability. 
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because the provinces have such significant responsibility, voters have incentives to vote their policy 
preferences at the provincial level; whereas in more centralized systems they have incentives to vote their 
national preferences in subnational elections. 
XX Such tactics are used effectively elsewhere – in Spain, for example. Gardner and Abad (2011: 509-510). Cf., 
however, Wright (2016: 29), claiming that ‘Public criticism of federal initiatives by the provinces is a staple of 
intergovernmental politics in Canada.’ Wright later goes on to cast doubt on the efficacy of this tactic as a 
means by which provinces might discipline the national government (36-44). 
XXI Swinton (1990: 10-20) describes the court’s decisions as only an early move in what is often a series of 
strategic actions by provincial governments. Ryder (2006: 353) similarly describes ‘a familiar pattern in Canadian 
federalism’ in which an initial victory in court by the central government is followed by the losing province 
being ‘accommodated politically through intergovernmental negotiations.’ Scholars, moreover, seem to agree 
that the Supreme Court has in recent years backed away from an aggressive form of judicial review of structural 
issues, preferring instead to let the political branches work out their disagreements through negotiations (Wright 
2010; Ryder 2006; Brouillet 2006). 
XXII Choudhry (2003: 82) argues that the ‘site for the evolution of the legal framework governing social policy 
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